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The Internationalization of the Renminbi
*
 
By  Ronald W Anderson
†
 
November 20, 2015 
 
My subject is the internationalization of the Renminbi (RMB).  While the development of the use of 
the Chinese currency in international trade and finance has been on-going for many years, the topic 
is very timely.  The IMF is currently considering whether the RMB should join the elite club of major 
currencies that make up its reserve unit called the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and a decision is 
expected by the end of this year.    
China had proposed the RMB for SDR inclusion five years ago when the IMF last considered the 
composition of the SDR basket, and at that time it was unsuccessful.  In 2015 the IMF once again 
considers the issue, and this year China has been very active in promoting its case.  Understanding 
why the RMB was not accepted into the SDR basket in 2010 and what steps China has been taking in 
order to make its case convincing can tell us much about where China stands in the process of 
liberalizing its economy. It can also give us an insight into the major challenges China’s policy makers 
will face in the years to come.   
But first, what is an SDR? SDR’s are not themselves freely exchanged, and you and I will never own 
one.  Rather they are reserve assets for countries that are members of the IMF.  They can be 
converted into the currencies in the basket and then into any currency that they wish on the open 
market.  If a member draws against its account one SDR it will receive 0.632 USD, 0.41 EUR, 18.4 JPY 
and 0.0903 GBP.  It can then convert these into any particular currency it needs at the current 
exchange rates.  The fact that countries need to be able convert their SDR’s into other currencies 
suggests the guiding principle that the IMF uses in deciding the composition of the SDR, namely, that 
the basket should be stable relative to major currencies.  Stated otherwise, it should represent a 
relatively stable store of value and therefore be acceptable as a reserve currency. The IMF’s 
operational criteria for SDR inclusion are that the currency should be that of a significant exporter 
and that the currency should be “freely usable” in trade and for balance of payments settlement by 
being traded on major exchanges.  China has been the world’s biggest exporting nation for some 
time; so it clearly meets the first criterion. But it was the hurdle of being “freely usable” that the 
RMB failed to clear in 2010.  
Countries draw upon or repay their SDR accounts at the IMF infrequently and the amounts of 
currency involved are relatively minor compared to the huge size of the global foreign exchange 
market.  So it is hard to point at any immediate practical benefit that China would enjoy if the RMB 
enters the SDR basket. Why then has China pushed so hard for SDR inclusion?   
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One answer is that it is a matter of prestige.  Inclusion of the RMB in the SDR basket would represent 
a highly public affirmation that China has joined the small group of nations who can claim to have a 
significant voice in deciding matters of global governance of economic policy.   It implicitly would be 
a vote of confidence by world leaders that China is a reliable partner and that it can be counted 
upon to contribute to economic policies that will foster economic growth and financial stability.  
However, China has other reasons for pushing for SDR basket inclusion that are motivated by 
Chinese domestic  considerations and, in my view, these may be even more important than the 
external validation of its policies by world leaders.  By setting the goal of SDR inclusion at this time, it 
helps to give momentum to the process of financial liberalization and gives concrete objectives to 
the leaders of the state bodies and major financial enterprises that collectively decide the structure 
of the Chinese financial system.  In order to meet the IMF’s criterion that the RMB be “freely usable” 
the Chinese authorities need to make RMB easily exchanged by domestic and foreign users.  To 
achieve this, China will need to take important steps toward opening up capital flows into and out of 
the country. In 2009, Chinese leaders announced the goal of making Shanghai by 2020 an 
international financial centre that can rival London, New York and Tokyo.  Today China is very far 
from matching those financial centres either in the degree of its openness of capital flows or in the 
maturity of its financial intermediaries, markets and regulatory authorities.  The institutional 
changes that the IMF is looking for in evaluating whether the RMB should be included in the SDR 
basket are all steps that will also help convince market participants they can do serious finance in 
Shanghai and do so safely and efficiently. 
China began its transition from a closed, centrally controlled economy toward an open, market 
based system in the 1980’s.  This is reflected in Figure 1 which shows China’s exports expressed as a 
per cent of China’s GDP.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: China’s exports since 1960  
Source: World Bank Economic Indicators 
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This shows that starting in the early 1980’s and continuing for 25 years the growth of China’s exports 
outstripped that of its fast-growing GDP.  That is, China pursued a policy of “export-led growth”.  
This policy encountered headwinds in the mid-1990’s when exports plateaued at something less 
than 20 per cent of GDP.  But it was given new impetus with China’s inclusion in the WTO in 2001, 
and this led to the burst of export growth until 2006 when its exports stood at 35 per cent of GDP.  
This remarkable performance was made possible only through a radical adaptation of Chinese state-
owned and private manufacturing firms to meet the requirements of competing in world markets.  
Thus trade liberalization was the vector of change which has completely transformed the functioning 
of enterprises, has led to the migration of large segments of China’s enormous population from the 
countryside to the urban manufacturing centres, and has led to a dramatic increase in the standard 
of living for many hundreds of millions of Chinese.  
The pursuit of exports is a strategy that has been pursued by other Asian economies which have 
emulated in some degree the experience of Japan after the Second World War.  However, unlike 
Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand which opened their economies to trade and also to capital 
investments, China has moved cautiously in capital accounts liberalization.  This caution paid off in 
the 1997 when the Asian financial crisis erupted and led to severe disruptions of those fast-
liberalizers but not to China.   
That experience no doubt reinforced China’s cautious tendencies, and until today it has maintained 
tight controls on both inflows and outflows of capital either as direct investments or as portfolio 
investments.   These controls have given Chinese authorities a number of policy levers that it has 
actively used in trying to keep the Chinese economy on a strong growth path while trying to avoid 
overheating that could lead to destabilizing inflation.  However, quantitative capital controls have 
the effect of creating a divergence between the domestic price of financial assets and the external 
price of comparable assets.  And these distortions represent an important source of economic 
inefficiency by making the domestic cost of capital significantly different than the cost of capital in 
world markets.  For example, according to Deutsche Bank research in 2014 the domestic interest 
rate set by the Peoples’ Bank of China for good borrowers stood at 6.4 per cent while at the same 
time the off-shore rate on BBB RMB paper in Hong Kong was 3.95 per cent. This meant that some 
Chinese enterprises with good projects returning 4 or more per cent were being starved for capital 
and were unable to grow or were forced to shut down.    
The distortions created by capital controls are also reflected in the divergence of on-shore and off-
shore RMB exchange rates.  This has become clear in recent years with the emergence of an active 
market for off-shore RMB in HK.  At times the off-shore rate against dollars, denoted CNH/USD, has 
differed significantly from the Chinese domestic rate, denoted CNY/USD.  And this has led 
participants to pursue a variety of wasteful strategies of dubious legality in an attempt arbitrage the 
difference.   
In light of the difficulty of maintaining complicated exchange controls in an economic system that is 
so deeply engaged in competing in world trade, starting in 2009 Chinese authorities began to make 
significant steps to relax capital controls.  This has involved a number of technical institutional 
changes which have laid the foundation for the freer flow of capital.  An example of this has been 
the cooperation for cross-border RMB trade settlement between the PBOC and the monetary 
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authorities in Hong Kong, Macao, and ASEAN countries. This operated at first for exporting firms 
based in Shanghai and four cities in the Pearl River Delta region of Guangdong Province, but it was 
progressively extended to exporters in the rest of China.  A further important change was the 
creation of a mechanism for outward bound direct investments by Chinese enterprises.   Inward 
bound stock market investments in China have been authorized for the last ten years under the 
Qualified Foreign Investment Institution (QFII) scheme, but the quotas been increased significantly in 
recent years.  At the same time a significant number of Chinese companies have been listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  The first major step toward outward bound portfolio investment was 
taken in 2014 with the initiation of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect programme.   Given 
strong interest by mainland investors, the quota under this programme was quickly reached and has 
been increased subsequently.  In response to this new source of equity investors, financial 
intermediaries have issued RMB denominated exchange traded funds (ETF’s).  This opens the door 
for Chinese investors to invest in RMB assets that track the performance of a variety of foreign 
market segments.     
The steps toward opening investment flows to and from China have continued at an even more 
rapid pace in 2015 as part of China’s efforts to gain SDR inclusion for the RMB.  Foreign central 
banks, sovereign wealth funds and international financial institutions have been granted access to 
issuing on-shore RMB bonds.  The fixing procedure for the CNY has been modified to be more in line 
with that of the CNH thus removing one impediment to CNY-CNH convergence.   President Xi 
Jinping’s visit to the UK gave rise to a flurry of bilateral measures between the China and the UK 
including the issuance of a RMB denominated bond issue by the UK Treasury, establishment of a 
channel for RMB trade settlement in London, and the issuance in London of short-term RMB 
denominated paper by the People’s Bank of China.  In part, this has been directed at making London 
the most important centre for trading RMB assets that operates in the prime time-zone that 
straddles both Asian trading and North American trading.    
Taken as a whole these steps represent a substantial move toward more open financial markets that 
are freed up from the heavy constraints imposed previously.  This will give Chinese firms alternative 
sources of capital funds.  Liberalization also promises to deliver substantial benefits to Chinese 
investors who will have the opportunity to diversify their holdings with foreign investments.  It also 
means that domestic financial markets will be transformed through the participation of foreign 
financial institutions.  Opening an economy to foreign portfolio flows is sometimes feared because 
the so-called “hot money” from abroad might lead to high stock market volatility.  However, in the 
Chinese context where the notoriously skittish behaviour of domestic traders can generate 
enormous volatility, the presence of foreign institutional traders, some of which will be operating 
unlevered, slow-moving index-tracking funds,  could serve to reduce the of volatility of the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock markets.   
The opening of Chinese financial markets will not only bring benefits.  It also will bring very 
significant challenges for Chinese policy makers.  In fact, these challenges have become increasingly 
apparent since 2014.   
As has already been argued, the main thrust of Chinese economic policy can be understood as 
export-led growth.  This policy encountered difficulties starting in 2008 with the onset of the World 
Financial Crisis which induced a downturn in the global economy.  While Chinese exports rebounded 
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with the return to growth of global GDP, in fact, the pace of export growth lagged behind the growth 
of the rest of the Chinese economy.  This is apparent in Figure 1 which shows that the ratio of 
exports to GDP has fallen sharply since 2007.  The reasons for the relative weakness in Chinese 
exports can be found in the steady increase in Chinese domestic labour costs and in the appreciation 
of the RMB relative to the USD and other major currencies.   The latter is reflected in Figure 2 which 
plots the course of the CNY/EUR exchange rate since 2007 and 2015.  During this period the RMB has 
undergone a very large and sustained appreciation.  Between early 2014 and early 2015 alone it 
appreciated 25 per cent, falling from about 8.7 CNY/EUR to about 6.6 CNY/EUR.   
 
Figure 2: The RMB Euro Exchange Rate 
The weak relative performance of the Chinese export sector combined with a sustained appreciation 
of the RMB on world currency markets suggests that China is in a transition phase that will gradually 
lead it to abandon its reliance on exports as the main engine of economic growth and will 
increasingly focus on the development of the internal market.  In the future, China will probably 
begin to resemble somewhat the profile the US which is major player in world trade but where, 
given the huge size of the internal market, exports represent only about 13 per cent of GDP.   
This important evolution in China’s trade position has profound implications for its financial sector 
and for the conduct of monetary policy.  The policy of export led growth was supported by a 
complementary exchange rate policy which resulted in the undervaluation of the RMB relative to the 
so-called purchasing power parity exchange rate.  In order to prevent the appreciation of the RMB or 
at least to slow it, Chinese authorities needed to intervene regularly on foreign exchange markets to 
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supply RMB in order to fill the gap between RMB demand and supply.  This resulted in the 
accumulation of large amounts of foreign reserves.  This is seen Figure 3 which shows that official 
reserves grew enormously since China’s entry in the WTO in 2001, reaching a total of about 4 trillion 
USD in August 2014. A large fraction of these reserves have been kept in USD largely in the form of 
US Treasury Securities.  By way of comparison, the total debt of the US Federal Government is about 
18 trillion USD.  So China is one of the US’s largest creditors.  
 
Figure 3: China’s Foreign Reserves (trillion USD) 
Source: World Bank Economic Indicators 
In the past, the fact that private demand for RMB regularly exceeded private supply of RMB on 
world markets meant that it was relatively easy for Chinese authorities to maintain a reasonably 
stable exchange rate or to allow it to change smoothly along a trend.  They merely needed to 
increase or decrease its RMB sales to compensate for short-term fluctuations of supply and demand 
at the target exchange rate.   
There are reasons to believe that this pattern has changed in the last year and that the RMB had 
reached the point earlier in 2015 where RMB demand and supply for trade purposes were roughly 
balanced.  In addition, since 2014 the weakness of Chinese exports has convinced domestic and 
foreign investors that the traditionally strong growth sectors of the Chinese economy no longer 
represent attractive investment prospects.  The result has been a shift from private capital inflows to 
private capital outflows.  This has meant that the overall balance of supply and demand on foreign 
exchange markets switched from excess demand for RMB to excess supply.  This implied that in 
order to continue their policy of exchange rate stabilization Chinese authorities had to intervene on 
markets by buying RMB and that to do so they had to draw down their total reserves by 
approximately 500 billion USD.   Such a steep decline in reserves led China to re-evaluate its foreign 
exchange policy, and in August it announced major changes with the effect that it would tolerate 
larger fluctuations in the exchange rate than in the past.  The RMB was allowed to fall some 4 per 
cent in USD terms, but even that depreciation was insufficient to balance the market. Chinese 
reserves dropped by 93 billion USD in the month of August alone.  World stock markets reacted to 
the August currency announcement with a broad sell-off.  In the following weeks the world financial 
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press was filled with discussions about the weakness of the Chinese economy with wild speculations 
about the way Chinese authorities would respond. This was an unprecedented example of a Chinese 
policy announcement having a significant impact on world markets.  American and European firms in 
general are not very heavily dependent on China related business.  So it unlikely that stock market 
participants feared a direct impact on those firms’ earnings.  Rather the reaction of Western stock 
markets seemed to reflect a perception of increased risk because of the uncertainty in the policy 
direction that China might take in responding to its current growth slow-down.   
To conclude, I have argued that by proposing that the RMB be included in the SDR China has staked 
its claim to have a full voice in the global governance of economic policy making.  This is a 
manifestation of China’s growing self-confidence based on its success in sustaining rapid 
development of its economy for more than two decades despite many doubters of its policies world-
wide.  The leadership role played by the China in the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank is another important example of this direction of Chinese international policy.  In order to 
assume this new role China has had to go beyond its ingrained caution regarding the opening of 
capital flows and is moving decisively in the direction of a more liberalized financial sector.  This 
holds the promise of a more flexible means of financing further economic growth in China and in 
providing an aging population a means of assuring the continued increase in economic well-being in 
the future.  But this carries with it very important challenges for China in framing policies that are 
appropriate for a new phase in China’s development which will be based on the growth of its 
internal market.  One challenge is to move away from quantitative controls of financial flows toward 
monetary policy tools that are more compatible with an open, market-based financial system.  
However, just as important, Chinese authorities need to be able to communicate the logic of their 
policies to the international policy community, to world markets, and, most importantly, to the 
Chinese people themselves. 
		
